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 Daily Satisfaction as a Joint Function of Positive and Negative Affect:   
Moderating Effects of Cognitive Habits 
Indra Alam Syah Bin Aziz 
ABSTRACT 
The study aims to investigate the effects of individual differences in cognitive habits on the 
relation between affect and satisfaction in daily life. Specifically, this study aims to examine if 
individual differences in savouring, rumination and catastrophizing may moderate the effects of 
positive (PA) and negative affect (NA) on daily satisfaction judgments. 190 undergraduate 
students from Singapore Management University were recruited to participate in an experience 
sampling study in which they provided ratings of PA and NA across the day, as well as their end-
of-day satisfaction levels over five days. Using multilevel modelling and response surface 
methodology, daily satisfaction levels was modelled as a joint function of daily-averaged, 
daytime and evening PA and NA, and their interaction with trait measures of savouring, 
rumination and catastrophizing to investigate potential moderating effects. The pattern of results 
suggests that when daily satisfaction judgments are modelled as a joint function of daily-
averaged PA and NA, the effects of PA and NA on satisfaction judgments appear to cancel out 
each other. Moderating effects of savouring, catastrophizing and rumination were only present in 
the joint relation between daily satisfaction and daytime affect
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AFFECT AND SATISFACTION 
Daily Satisfaction as a Joint Function of Positive and Negative Affect:   
Moderating Effects of Cognitive Habits 
Satisfaction is a cognitive judgment based on evaluating one’s current circumstances 
against an appropriate or desired state of affairs (Campbell, 1976; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & 
Griffin, 1985) and is determined by the discrepancy between these two states. Satisfaction is an 
important judgment: individuals spend a considerable amount of their waking life behaving in 
accordance and pursuit of wants. Satisfaction increases the closer our current situation is to our 
desired state and decreases as our expectations and standards are increasingly unmet (Pavot & 
Diener, 1993; Pavot & Diener, 2008). Given the importance of satisfaction to the quality of life, 
research efforts have been directed to understanding predictors of satisfaction, such as income, 
self-esteem and personality traits such as optimism and extraversion (Myers & Diener, 1995). 
Affect as a Predictor of Satisfaction 
Satisfaction, positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) form the three pillars of 
subjective well-being (SWB; Diener, 1984) and together they are indicative of an individual’s 
well-being. Although there are correlated, they are distinct from each other (Lucas, Diener, & 
Suh, 1996). The evaluative nature of satisfaction implies a cognitive judgment process that is 
distinct from the experience of affective states (PA and NA). They also relate to different 
outcomes. Satisfaction is more strongly associated with income and other forms of material 
consumption (Diener, Kahneman, Tov, & Arora, 2010; Howell & Howell, 2008; Oishi & 
Schimmack, 2010). In contrast, affect is more strongly associated with having supportive social 
relationships and personal autonomy (Diener, Ng, Harter, & Arora, 2010; Tay & Diener, 2011).  
Some models of well-being emphasize PA and NA as contributors to satisfaction (Busseri 
& Sadava, 2011). This perspective proposes that people use information about positive and 
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negative affective experiences when deciding satisfaction levels, to the extent that “half of the 
variability” in satisfaction judgments can be explained by such affective information (Diener, 
1994; Diener, Napa Scollon, & Lucas, 2003; Diener, Lucas, Oishi, & Suh, 2002; Emmons & 
Diener, 1985; Kim-Prieto, Diener, Tamir, Scollon, & Diener, 2005). Relatedly, Weiss and 
Cropanzano (1996) also propose that (job) satisfaction is shaped by the recall of affective 
episodes at work and the patterns of affective responses to these episodes. According to the 
“mood as information” approach (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; Clore & Storbeck, 2006; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1988; Schwarz & Clore, 2003), affective states represent information that 
individuals can draw upon when formulating their attitudes toward objects, events or people. For 
example, a bad mood could indicate that one’s life circumstances are undesirable, reducing 
judgments of life satisfaction (Schwarz & Clore, 1983;1988). 
The present study seeks to advance existing research in two ways. First, whereas past 
work focused on life satisfaction or global satisfaction judgments, the current research focuses on 
daily satisfaction and how affective experiences might influence it. This is useful as it moves 
beyond comparing how average levels of affect correlate with satisfaction, to a more process-
oriented approach that can vary across individuals. This also allows the study of how within-
person processes linking affect to satisfaction are moderated by between-person characteristics. 
A daily process approach also suffers less from any bias due to poor recall of events or influences 
from momentary affective states (adapted from Tennen, Affleck, Armeli, & Carney, 2000).  
Second, prior research has looked at the independent influence of either PA and NA on 
the evaluation of the positivity or negativity of events, person evaluations and the perceived 
probability of positive and negative events happening (Brief, Butcher, & Roberson, 1995; 
Busseri, Sadava, & DeCourville, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Strack, 1991). Other 
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studies have also looked at the relative balance of PA and NA (via difference scores) in 
determining satisfaction (Schimmack, Diener, & Oishi, 2002; Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, Oishi, 
Dzokoto, & Ahadi, 2002; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998). The joint effect of PA and NA 
on satisfaction however has received less attention. When daily levels of PA exceed NA, it 
suggests that the day’s events met individual standards or liking, making for a satisfying day. 
When day levels of NA exceed PA, it suggests that daily events were not liked and fell short of 
expectations, corresponding to lower satisfaction levels. However, our satisfaction level on days 
when levels of PA and NA are subjectively equivalent is less obvious. PA and NA seem to impact 
satisfaction in opposing directions: because of this we could feel satisfied, dissatisfied or even 
indifferent depending on which affect impacts our satisfaction more.   
The exact nature of this joint effect of PA and NA on satisfaction, and the potential 
moderators of this link are the focus of this study. In this proposal, I will describe how I expect 
daily satisfaction to covary with affective experience. To explain this, I introduce the concept of 
affective congruence and affective discrepancy. I then discuss contrasting views on how the 
congruence or discrepancy between PA and NA relates to satisfaction levels and how this might 
differ when linking satisfaction to daytime affect, versus evening affect. I then hypothesize that 
individual differences in how people process positive and negative experiences moderate how 
satisfaction changes at points of affective congruence and discrepancy.  
Conceptualizing Relativity between PA and NA 
The relative balance of PA and NA judgments might impact how satisfaction judgments 
fluctuate. Two ways are characterizing this affective balance are affective discrepancy and 
affective congruence. 
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Affective discrepancy describes situations where the levels of PA and NA are unequal. 
Affectively discrepant days could refer to days where PA is experienced to a greater extent than 
NA (affective discrepancy favouring PA); or days where NA is experienced to a greater extent 
than PA (affective discrepancy favouring NA). Affective congruence describes situations where 
PA and NA are experienced at subjectively equivalent levels. This could refer either to days 
where PA and NA are both not experienced at all (low point of affective congruence) or days 
where high levels of both PA and NA are experienced (high point of affective congruence). The 
concept of affective congruence is related to research on affective ambivalence, i.e. the 
simultaneous experience of both positive and negative emotions in response towards a target 
referent (Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001; Rees, Rothman, Lehavy, & Sanchez-Burks, 2013; 
Ashforth, Rogers, Pratt, & Pradies, 2014; in Rothman, Pratt, Rees, & Vogus, 2017). However, 
whereas research on ambivalence emphasizes the simultaneous experience of both PA and NA, 
this paper’s notion of affective congruence simply emphasizes equivalent levels of affect 
experienced over a specified period of time, not necessarily at the same time. 
On a daily basis, individuals do experience varying levels of congruence or discrepancy 
between PA and NA. Empirical studies looking into daily emotional experience have observed 
sufficient occurrences of affective congruence as well as discrepancy in daily experience (Tov & 
Lee, 2016, see Tables S1 to S6 in supplementary materials). This implies that the terms “affective 
congruence” and “affective discrepancy” add value as common points of understanding in 
theoretical discussions about relative PA and NA experience, and as part of an empirical 
programme research to mark significant points of study in affective experience.  
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Changes in Daily Satisfaction Judgments as a Function of Affective Discrepancy and 
Affective Congruence 
Affective discrepancy. The preponderance of PA over NA in a day suggests consistency 
between daily events and our preferences or expectations, leading us to expect higher satisfaction 
levels on those days. Conversely, the preponderance of NA over PA in a day suggests a violation 
of preferences and expectations leading to lower levels of satisfaction. Accordingly, satisfaction 
is expected to be lowest on days dominated by NA and highest on days dominated by PA 
(Bradburn, 1969; Suh, Diener, Oishi & Triandis, 1998). 
Affective congruence. Unlike the case for affective discrepancy, it is less obvious how 
satisfaction levels should change at different degrees of affective congruence. The expected 
relation may depend on one’s theory of how a person differentially weighs the influence of PA 
and NA onto daily satisfaction. Three possibilities are considered below. 
Satisfaction stays the same from lower to higher points of affective congruence. The 
affect balance model is based on Bradburn’s (1969) suggestion that the influence of PA and NA 
neutralise each other when experienced at subjectively equivalent levels. According to Bradburn 
(1969), satisfaction is solely driven by the discrepancy between PA and NA. As such, affective 
congruence, whether at low points or at high points of congruence, should not be associated with 
a significant change in satisfaction. In both cases, the influence of PA and NA on satisfaction 
should cancel out each other. 
Satisfaction decreases from lower to higher points of affective congruence. A different 
prediction stems from research suggesting that many psychological processes are biased towards 
negative stimuli (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). 
Rozin and Royzman (2001) proposed that when people are presented with positive and negative 
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information, the overall appraisal will be more negative than the algebraic sum of the subjective 
values associated with each piece of information. Research on loss aversion (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991) and negativity bias in categorization (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 
1998) also find that negatively framed events have more influence than positively framed events 
on cognition and behaviour. These findings support the negativity dominance model, which 
predicts that satisfaction should fall from low points of affective congruence to high points of 
congruence because the impact of NA on satisfaction is weighted more than the impact of PA. 
Research on affective ambivalence might also predict negativity dominance. According to 
Oliver (1997) ambivalence itself is linked to lower levels of satisfaction, because the 
simultaneous experience of two emotions represents uncertainty and dissonance, leading to 
psychological discomfort which may involve general feelings of apprehension that detract from 
satisfaction levels (in Taylor, 2008). There is some support for this idea from consumer research 
findings revealing a negative association between ambivalence towards a product and product 
satisfaction (Olsen, Wilcox, & Olsson, 2005; Tuu & Olsen, 2010). Though these results are 
consistent with negativity dominance, it is important to note that the present study assess levels 
of affect within a day and not necessarily at the exact same moment (as emphasized by 
ambivalence research). 
Satisfaction increases from lower to higher points of affective congruence. Yet another 
contrasting view is held by researchers who have observed a bias in how fast the intensity of 
affect from recalled (positive vs negative) events dissipates over time, terming it the fading affect 
bias or FAB (Holmes, 1970; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003; Ritchie, Skowronski, 
Hartnett, Wells, & Walker, 2009). The FAB first draws a distinction between (i) how people feel 
during an event and (ii) how they feel when recalling the same event at a later time. The FAB 
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describes how the recall of negative events induces less intense negative affect at the point of 
recall when compared to the original intensity during the event. In contrast, recalling of positive 
events on the other hand will tend to induce pleasant feelings that are closer to (though still less 
than) their original intensities. Ritchie et al. (2009) demonstrated that the FAB remains even 
when people are instructed to (i) remember how they felt when the event occurred versus 
reporting how they currently feel as they recall the event. It is important to note that the FAB 
does not predict that people immediately forget their negative experiences. The FAB emphasizes 
that what fades first is not memories of the negative event, but the intensity of the negative affect 
when that event is recalled later. 
One implication of the FAB is that the impact of PA on satisfaction should be greater than 
NA due to the greater preservation of PA intensity over time. Thus, the positivity dominance 
model posits that satisfaction levels increase when we compare low points of affective 
congruence to high points of affective congruence, because the impact of PA on satisfaction 
levels outweighs NA. In addition to the FAB, other perspectives supporting the positivity 
dominance model include Matlin and Stang’s (1978) Pollyanna principle which proposes that 
people tend to rehearse (in memory) positive events more than negative events and by Matlin 
and Underhill (1979) who also found that the pleasantness of words is positively associated with 
rehearsal frequency. Rehearsal of memories might favour positive events could be due to 
individuals being more motivated to maintain PA in memory and their preference to re-
experience positive affect by selectively rehearsing positive events in memory because it is 
pleasurable (Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Ritchie, 2009). The additional PA triggered 
by rehearsing positive memories such as positive information about the self or thinking about 
past successes may serve to alleviate negative mood (Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996).  
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Taylor’s (1991) mobilisation-minimisation hypothesis offers another possible mechanism: people 
mobilise more resources and activate processes to minimize the (harmful) effects of NA but do 
not do as much to minimize the effects of PA. This model may suggest a motivational 
mechanism that contributes to the FAB.  
Research Question 1: Resolving Theoretical Differences on the Relation between PA, NA 
and Satisfaction 
Our discussion on the trajectory of satisfaction in relation to affective discrepancy and 
affective congruence gives rise to three competing views that cannot be all true on average. The 
first contribution of this paper is to conduct an empirical study that compares the joint 
association between different combinations of affect and the corresponding levels of satisfaction, 
so that a decision can be made as to which prediction (and which theories) best fits observations 
from day-to-day human experience. It is important to verify first the view that best predicts the 
general direction of association between satisfaction and affect, before factoring in variables that 
might increase the strength of this association or even reverse the direction. 
Few studies have formally tested these views. An exception to this was a programme of 
research by Tov and Lee (2016) which found robust support for positivity dominance. That is, 
satisfaction ratings of participants received greater influence from their daily rated levels of PA 
(versus NA) in cases of affective congruence. This they concluded after conducting six separate 
experiments while using different response formats, sampling from different cultural contexts as 
well as controlling for order effects in the measurement of affect and satisfaction levels. 
Following this, I similarly predict that positivity dominance characterizes the relation between 
satisfaction and affective congruence. 
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H1: The relation between affect congruence and daily satisfaction is best described by the 
positivity dominance model: satisfaction is higher on days where high (versus low) points 
of affective congruence are experienced. 
Research Question 2: Comparing the Link between Satisfaction and Daytime Affect, versus 
Evening Affect 
Investigating Hypothesis 1 with a single point of measurement for affect and satisfaction 
ratings obscures the possibility of investigating that the impact of affective experiences on 
satisfaction might depend on how or whether they are remembered at the time of judgment. 
Similarly, It is likely that a person only bases their judgment on affective experiences that remain 
preserved in memory during judgment formation as these experiences would have greater 
accessibility. Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) hinted at this in discussing how affect may influence 
satisfaction judgments, noting that very little research has been done to answer the questions that 
they have. 
Finally, if job satisfaction is at least partially constructed on demand one could 
reasonably ask about the way affective experiences are used in the judgment process. The 
nature of the storage and recall process is unclear. When attitude judgments are made, are 
affectively meaningful events somehow counted? Are they averaged over events with 
different intensities? If averaged, are they weighted by recency? Very little research has 
been done on these questions” (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996, p. 50). 
Studies suggest that recent affective experiences have small but reliable effects on how 
people assess their day overall—over and above average levels of momentary affect during the 
day (Parkinson, Briner, Reynolds & Totterdell, 1995). The recency of an event may be an 
important factor in how the FAB alters the relative intensities of positive versus negative 
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experiences. It is possible that positivity dominance is weaker or even reversed when predicting 
satisfaction from recent affective experiences. Processes that contribute to negativity bias (e.g., 
loss aversion; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991) may enhance 
the effect of recent NA on satisfaction, enabling recent NA to dominate or offset recent PA in 
judgments of satisfaction. Assuming that positivity dominant arises in part due to FAB,  the 
relative impact of PA over NA might be more evident for “older” (less recent) experiences. This 
is because the fading affect bias would have had more time to operate on experiences that 
occurred earlier in the day (“daytime affect”), as compared to affect rated later in the day 
(“evening affect”).  This would be an important finding as it suggests that the search for a model 
that accounts for affect-satisfaction relations is qualified by understanding the conditions under 
which each of the three models discussed becomes more applicable. In this regard I predict that 
the link between daytime affect and satisfaction should demonstrate positivity dominance to a 
greater extent than evening affect. This would also allow me to test out the viability of FAB as 
one mechanism underlying possible positivity dominance effects if the positivity dominance 
model receives empirical support (as per Hypothesis 1). 
H2: Positivity dominance is stronger in the link between daytime affect and satisfaction, 
than between evening affect and satisfaction. 
Research Question 3: Possible Moderators of the Effects of Affective Congruence and 
Affective Discrepancy on Satisfaction 
The relation between affective congruence and satisfaction might depend not only on the 
recency of affective experience, but on the particular individual as well. A key research question 
is what type of individual differences moderate the effect of affective congruence on satisfaction. 
Dispositional approaches to satisfaction (for a review, see Judge, 1992) posit that to some degree 
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a person’s satisfaction judgments reflects their general tendency to evaluate all aspects of life 
positively or negatively (Weitz, 1952; Staw & Ross, 1985). Past work looking dispositional 
influences on affect and satisfaction emphasize the role of affective dispositions. Some 
researchers have proposed that dispositional levels of PA and NA influence mood states at work, 
which in turn influences satisfaction judgments (Weiss, Nicholas, & Daus, 1993). Cropanzano, 
James and Konovsky (1993) also showed that trait-level PA and NA correlated with global 
satisfaction. Similarly, Levin and Stokes (1989) found that task satisfaction was quite 
independent of task type but was more closely associated with the degree of trait-level negative 
affectivity among their participants.  
However, aside from showing main effects of affective disposition on satisfaction, the 
previous work has not clarified whether and how individuals differentially weigh positive versus 
negative affective experiences. A tendency to experience high levels of PA or NA does not 
necessarily mean that these experiences are weighted more in satisfaction judgments. Although 
Cropanzano, James and Konovsky’s (1993) found that the effect of positive events were stronger 
for individuals who are already high on dispositional PA, Oishi et al. (2007) found that the 
impact of positive daily events on a person’s daily satisfaction is weaker for individuals already 
high in global well-being but stronger among individuals who were relatively lower in global 
well-being.  
With respect to weighting of PA versus NA, individual differences other than broad 
affective dispositions may be more relevant. In particular, it is possible that some individuals 
process positive experiences in a way that amplifies the effect of PA on satisfaction (i.e., 
positivity dominance) or process negative experiences in a way that intensifies the impact of NA. 
These examples draw attention to individual differences in emotion regulation tendencies—
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rather than the disposition to experience either NA or PA. The latter largely speak to how often 
NA and PA are experienced, but do not necessarily clarify how people respond to positive and 
negative experiences when they occur (e.g., do they attempt to intensify the emotions 
accompanying these experiences). In this regard I focus on three individual difference variables – 
cognitive habits-- that correspond to how individuals might biasedly preserve positive affective 
information (savouring), negative information (catastrophizing) or enhance memory for affective 
experiences more generally (analytical rumination). In contrast to extraversion and neuroticism –
which are broad personality traits associated with average mood levels—savouring, 
catastrophizing and rumination are more specific to how people selectively process positive and 
negative events. Such processing may selectively enhance either the perceived intensity or 
memory for positive (or negative events) and ultimately influence which experiences are 
weighted more in satisfaction judgments. 
Savouring Beliefs  
Savouring beliefs (Bryant, 1989; 2003) refer to a set of beliefs about one’s capacity to 
derive pleasure from positive outcomes. Savouring involves the individual up-regulating positive 
affect -- typically by generating, maintaining or enhancing positive emotions by paying attention 
to positive experience from the past, present or future (Bryant, 1989, 2003; Bryant, Ericksen, & 
DeHoek, 2008; Bryant & Veroff, 2007). Other researchers (Nelis, Quoidbach, Hansenne, & 
Mikolajczak, 2011) have also identified specific strategies individuals use to savour positive 
events: displaying positive emotions with non-verbal behaviours, being present, celebrating 
positive events with others and also “positive mental time travel” – a tactic where individuals 
vividly recall or anticipate positive events. Savouring is likely an important mechanism by which 
individuals derive positive affect from positive events (Jose, Lim, & Bryant, 2012). Additionally, 
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according to Bryant (2003) experiencing the happiness-inducing situation is separate from being 
able to savour the positive affect that arises from the situation. As such, individual differences in 
the ability to anticipate, feel, and re-feel happiness over time may well lead to differences in 
positive affect among individuals who experience positive events. In the context of this study, 
they should also lead to differences in the impact of PA on satisfaction. Whilst trait extraversion 
has been linked to higher levels of positive affect (Srivastava, Angelo, & Vallereux, 2008) via an 
increased frequency of positive events (social interaction episodes), the link between savouring 
beliefs and positive affect is by allowing the savouring individual to derive more intense positive 
affect per positive episode.  
The Savouring Beliefs Inventory (SBI, in Bryant, 2003) measures individuals’ perception 
of their ability to savour positive experiences by anticipating, prolonging present enjoyment and 
recalling positive events in ways that rekindle the PA felt during the episode. Specifically, in a 
study looking at savouring ability and enjoyment of a planned holiday, Bryant (2003) also found 
that higher participant scores on the ability to anticipate enjoyment and savour happy moments 
(measured before the vacation) predicted their satisfaction and enjoyment during the trip. High 
scores on the SBI were also positively related to the intensity and frequency of happiness, and 
negatively correlated with frequency of unhappiness.  
With regards to the link between affect and satisfaction judgments, individuals with a 
greater ability to savour (high savourers) likely value positive experiences more when they occur. 
Other researchers have also found that people who are higher in savouring receive a greater 
boost of positive affect from positive events (Jose, Lim, & Bryant, 2012). Savouring may also 
allow high savourers to discount detrimental effects of negative circumstances on satisfaction 
(Smith & Bryant, 2016). On days when equal levels of PA and NA are experienced (affective 
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congruence), the satisfaction of high savourers should receive a greater impact from PA (versus 
NA) as compared to low savourers. Thus, positivity dominance is enhanced for high savourers as 
compared to low savourers.  
H3A: In situations of affective congruence, high savourers should demonstrate stronger 
positivity dominance as compared to low savourers.  
Based on a similar logic, the effect of affective discrepancy should be larger for high 
savourers than for low savourers. The ability of high savourers to savour positive experiences 
should be enhanced on days where there is little interference from NA. The less NA (relative to 
PA) there is, the better high savourers can savour and derive satisfaction from their positive 
experiences. 
H3B: The effect of affective discrepancy on daily satisfaction levels should be larger for 
high savourers than for low savourers. 
Catastrophizing  
While savouring refers to an individual’s ability to derive positive affect from positive 
events, catastrophizing refers to the tendency to entertain thoughts that explicitly emphasize the 
terror of negative emotional experiences (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007) and an exaggerated negative 
orientation towards unpleasant stimuli (Sullivan, Bishop & Pivik, 1995). According to Garnefski 
and Kraaij (2007), catastrophizing is characterized by a continuous thought fixation on how bad 
a negative experience was and exaggeration of how bad one’s situation is relative to other times 
or other people’s experiences. Catastrophizing style of cognitive emotional regulation was 
positively associated with an increase in self-reported depressive and anxiety symptoms 
(Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001) as well as with maladaptation, 
emotional distress and depression (Sullivan, Bishop & Pivik, 1995) across various age samples 
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(Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006). The above pool of evidence suggests a negative relationship between 
catastrophizing and the affective component of well-being. 
With regards to the link between positive and negative affect and satisfaction judgments, 
high catastrophizers (“Hi-Cats”) may exaggerate the consequences of negative events when they 
arise, and these exaggerations may increase the impact of NA on daily satisfaction compared 
with low catastrophizers (“Lo-Cats”). On days when equal levels of PA and NA are experienced 
(i.e., affective congruence), the satisfaction of Hi-Cats should receive a greater influence from 
NA than PA, whereas the reverse is expected for Lo-Cats. Thus, Hi-Cats should exhibit 
negativity dominance whereas Lo-Cats should exhibit positivity dominance.  
H4A: In situations of affective congruence, Hi-Cats should exhibit negativity dominance, 
whereas Lo-Cats should exhibit positivity dominance. 
Affective discrepancy should have a larger effect on Hi-Cats than Lo-Cats because their 
tendencies to think the worst about things will be stronger on days that are largely negative. 
H4B: The effect of affective discrepancy on satisfaction levels should be larger for Hi-
Cats than for Lo-Cats. 
Rumination  
Rumination can be viewed as a style of responding to negative emotions that generally 
involves a preoccupation with symptoms, antecedents and consequences of distress (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998; 2000). Although rumination may centre on one’s subjective affective 
experience as suggested by Smith and Alloy (2009), Andrews and Thomson Jr. (2009) propose 
an instrumental or analytical view of rumination: that this repetitive thought could be part of a 
broader human adaptation to generate a solution for a yet unresolved issue (analytical rumination 
hypothesis). Further support for an analytical view on rumination is also evident in research 
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attempts to measure rumination. In conceiving the Cognitive Emotional Regulation 
Questionnaire, Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven (2001) specified what they considered as a 
ruminative strategy to be one that is “focused on thought” without any explicit intention to 
amplify negative information as measured in the rumination subscale items. Watkins (2008, goal 
progress theory) also deems rumination as a response to “goals that have yet to be attained” or 
insufficient goal progress, as individuals were observed to recall information from uncompleted 
tasks better than completed tasks (Smith & Alloy, 2009; Watkins, 2008). This suggests how 
rumination might detract from and lower one’s daily satisfaction levels because its presence 
denotes some unresolved problem or insufficient goal progress.  
The rehearsal involved in rumination might result in the preservation of NA in memory 
which might dampen the positivity dominance that was earlier predicted to be true in general. 
Past research has demonstrated a link between rumination and depressive symptoms (Garnefski, 
Kraaij & Spinhoven, 2001; Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006; Garnefksi & Kraaij, 2007) but with a 
caveat: the way rumination was measured was in the context of threatening or stressful events 
that participants were told to think about when they were answering the questionnaire. 
However, rumination is not expected to enhance NA in the same way as catastrophizing 
is expected to. Whereas catastrophizing intensifies negative experiences, rumination may simply 
preserve their perceived relevance and intensity.  In other words, rumination is expected to only 
eliminate positivity dominance, but not necessarily to result in negativity dominance. As such on 
days characterized by affective congruence, positivity dominance is attenuated for high (versus) 
low ruminators, reflecting greater affect balance. 
H5A: In situations of affective congruence, high ruminators should exhibit affect balance; 
whereas low ruminators should exhibit positivity dominance. 
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However, affective discrepancy is expected to have a stronger effect on satisfaction for 
high (vs low) ruminators. On days where NA is abundant and PA is low, the repetitive thinking of 
high ruminators will compound the memory and impact of NA with no opposing impact from 
PA, driving satisfaction down further than for low ruminators. 
H5B: The effect of affective discrepancy on satisfaction levels should be larger for high 
ruminators than for low ruminators. 
Research Question 4: Individual Difference Moderators as a Function of Memory 
The study of moderating influences of these individual difference variables (Hypotheses 
3, 4 and 5) can also be extended if we consider that the link between affective congruence (or 
discrepancy) and satisfaction itself might change if daytime or evening affect is considered (per 
Hypothesis 2). Recalling my earlier prediction that positivity dominance should be stronger in 
the link between satisfaction and daytime affect versus evening affect (Hypothesis 2), the 
proposed moderating effects of the individual differences operating on the general pattern of 
positivity dominance are also predicted to be stronger in the link between satisfaction and 
daytime affect (versus evening affect).  
The conceptualization of savouring, catastrophizing and rumination processes appear to 
involve memory systems in that they impact how individuals differently process and recall 
memories of affective events. People who are high on savouring tend to reminisce and recall 
positive events to re-experience the positive affect (Bryant, 2003), a process which involves the 
rehearsal of such memories. This suggests that personality effects of savouring could manifest on 
the memory processes of high savourers over time. In pain research, catastrophizing has been 
shown to enhance recall and accuracy of pain episodes (Lefebvre & Keefe, 2002; Noel, Rabbitts, 
Tai, & Palermo, 2015). Rumination in response to negative moods has been shown to enhance 
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the recall of negative life events from memory by enhancing the impact of negative moods on the 
accessibility of negative memories and forming “anchor points” facilitating more negative 
memory recall (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Given that savouring, catastrophizing and rumination processes act on memory processes 
and that memories of daily events likely form the bases of daily satisfaction judgments, the 
moderating effects of these individual differences should be stronger on the link between 
daytime  than evening affective congruence (or discrepancy) and end-of-day satisfaction because 
the effects of these moderators on the memory of daytime events would be more evident. 
H6A: Savouring moderates the effect of affective congruence on satisfaction to a larger 
extent when satisfaction is related to daytime affect (versus evening affect).  
H6B: Catastrophizing moderates the effect of affective congruence on satisfaction to a 
larger extent when satisfaction is related to daytime affect (versus evening affect). 
H6C: Rumination moderates the effect of affective congruence on satisfaction to a larger 
extent when satisfaction is related to daytime affect (versus evening affect). 
H6D: Savouring moderates the effect of affective discrepancy on satisfaction to a larger 
extent when satisfaction is related to daytime affect (versus evening affect).  
H6E: Catastrophizing moderates the effect of affective discrepancy on satisfaction to a 
larger extent when satisfaction is related to daytime affect (versus evening affect). 
H6F: Rumination moderates the effect of affective discrepancy on satisfaction to a larger 
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Method 
Participants 
209 participants from Singapore Management University were recruited for an 
experience sampling study which lasted between five to seven days long. After data screening 
(see Results), the final sample comprised 190 participants (60 male). Participants’ age ranged 
from 18 years to 27 years (M = 21.8, SD = 1.72). 
Materials 
Items used in this proposed study are available in the Appendix for reference. 
Individual differences in cognitive habits. 
Savouring. The Savouring Beliefs Inventory (SBI, in Bryant, 2003) measures an 
individual’s belief about their capacity to savour positive experiences. The questionnaire 
comprises twenty-four self-report items split into three 8-item subscales measuring: the ability to 
savour by anticipating the positive emotions (α = 0.84), by prolonging positive emotion during 
the moment (α = 0.81), and by reminiscing past positive emotions (α = 0.83). A sample item in 
the anticipating subscale is “I can enjoy pleasant events in my mind before they actually occur”. 
A sample item in the momentary subscale is “I feel fully able to appreciate good things that 
happen to me”. A sample item in the reminiscing subscale is “I can make myself feel good by 
remember pleasant events from my past”. Participants were asked to indicate how much they 
agreed with the items on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
Catastrophizing. The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ) measures 
the cognitive components of emotion regulation in adolescents or adults after a negative of 
threatening experience (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007).  The catastrophizing subscale of the 
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire comprises four self-report items (α = 0.68) that 
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measure how frequently participants think in ways that emphasize the terrifying aspects of a 
negative event. A sample item in this subscale is “I continually think how horrible the situation 
has been”. Participants were asked to indicate how true they found the catastrophizing items to 
be of them after the experience of threatening or stressful life events on a 5-point scale (1 = 
almost never, 5 = almost always). Person-level scores for catastrophizing were computed by 
taking the arithmetic average of all items in the respective subscale. 
Rumination. The rumination subscale in (CERQ) comprises four self-report items (α = 
0.70) measuring how frequently participants focused thought on feelings and thoughts associated 
with a negative event. A sample item in this subscale is “I dwell upon the feelings the situation 
has evoked in me”. Participants were asked to indicate how true they found the rumination items 
to be of them after the experience of threatening or stressful life events on a 5-point scale (1 = 
almost never, 5 = almost always).  
Demographic variables. Participants were required to provide some basic information 
about themselves such as their sex and age. 
Experience sampling surveys. 
Half-day affect. Participants rated the extent they experienced the following positive and 
negative emotions (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely) during the daytime (2pm) and evening (7pm). 
Positive affect (PA) items included happy, positive, pleased, and good. Negative affect (NA) 
items included: sad, negative, upset and bad. The items were adapted from The Short Scale of 
Positive and Negative Experiences (Diener, Wirtz, Tov, Kim-Prieto, Choi, Oishi, & Biswas-
Diener, 2010). Cronbach’s alphas for daytime PA, daytime NA, evening PA and evening NA 
were 0.91, 0.86, 0.91, and 0.86, respectively 
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End-of-day satisfaction. Participants rated how satisfying the past day was at the end of 
the day based on six items (e.g., “Today I was satisfied with my life”; Tov & Lee, 2016), each on 
a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha for the end-of-day 
satisfaction items was 0.90. 
Procedure 
There are two major phases of the study. Phase 1 lasted one day collected participants’ 
individual difference measures via a pen and paper survey. Phase 2 lasted 5 days and was the 
Experience Sampling Period that collected daily affect and satisfaction ratings from participants. 
Phase 2 began a day after Phase 1 ended and utilised a smartphone application (Expimetrics) 
which enabled the collection of affect and satisfaction ratings via surveys delivered at timed 
intervals to participants’ smartphones. Participants were enrolled and completed the two 
experimental phases on a rolling basis.  
During Phase 1, participants are briefed about the study and completed a 20-minute 
survey. This survey comprised individual difference measures, questions about demographic 
information as well as other scales included for separate exploratory analyses.  
In Phase 2, for the next 5 days, participants received three time-contingent surveys per 
day through the Expimetrics App. The first survey was the Daytime Survey which was sent at 
2pm. The second survey was the Evening Survey which was sent at 7 pm. The Daytime and 
Evening Survey contained measures requiring participants rate their PA and NA for the early and 
later half of the day, respectively. The third survey is the End-of-the-Day Survey which was sent 
at 11pm each night, and contained measures requiring participants to rate their level of 
satisfaction for the day. In total participants had 5 days to complete 15 Phase 2 surveys. 
Participants had to access and complete the surveys within one hour from when they are 
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received, after which they were be unable to access it again and the survey was considered as 
missed. To buffer against participants missing surveys, a few additional daytime surveys and 
end-of-day surveys were made available after the initial 5-day sampling period.  
Of the 190 participants in the final sample, 107 participants completed Phase 1 and Phase 
2 surveys for participation credit (“credit participants”) and 83 participants completed the 
surveys for cash rewards (“cash participants”). Credit participants received two participation 
credits if they completed the Phase 1 survey and 15 Phase 2 surveys. If they failed to fulfil this 
criteria, they received no credit but were compensated with $5 for completing the Phase 1 survey 
and $0.40 for each completed Phase 2 survey. Cash participants received $5 for completing the 
Phase 1 survey and $0.40 for each completed Phase 2 survey. In addition, an incentive scheme 
rewarded cash participants with an additional dollar for every Phase 2 beyond a final tally of ten, 
allowing cash participants to earn up to $16 if they had completed the Phase 1 survey and all 15 
Phase 2 surveys. 
Data collection was slightly hindered due to random technical faults in the Expimetrics 
application that prevented some participants from receiving and completing Phase 2 surveys. 
There was insufficient information to determine the extent of participants affected due to this 
technical fault as it was difficult to distinguish between non-submissions due to the technical 
fault versus non-submissions due to participants failing to complete the surveys within the one 
hour response window.  
Analytic Strategy 
I chose polynomial regression with response surface methodology (RSM) to answer the 
research questions in this study. RSM analyses how two predictors combine to affect a third 
outcome (Cronbach & Gleser, 1953). Edwards and Parry (1993) advocated the use of RSM to 
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replace the use of difference scores in organizational research. RSM is ideal as it uses separate 
measures to examine their joint relationship with a third outcome, instead of combining them 
into a single score first. This overcomes problems associated with using difference scores to 
study the effects of two variables on a third variable (Cronbach, 1958; Edwards 1994; Edwards, 
2002, Edwards, 2007; Shanock, Baran, Gentry, Pattison & Heggestad, 2010). One relevant 
argument held by these researchers is that difference scores collapse information from two 
distinct sources of information into a single index. In doing so, difference scores confound the 
effects of each of the component measure on the outcome variable. Additionally, difference 
scores do not communicate how much each component measure contributes to the outcome 
variable. This is critical to the current paper: we need to demonstrate which affect appears to 
have more influence on satisfaction levels. By reducing PA and NA into single difference score 
before studying its link with satisfaction, we reduce the dimensions of analyses from three to 
two, sacrificing valuable information.  
Response surface methodology is also suited for studies where agreement between the 
two measures is of theoretical interest as exemplified by Edwards (2007) in his advocation of 
RSM in studying the consequences of person-environment (P-E) fit. Similarly, in the current 
paper, the effect of congruence between PA and NA on satisfaction is of central interest. 
Tov and Lee (2016) used RSM to explore how satisfaction judgments covary jointly with 
daily ratings of PA and NA taken at the end of the day. In the affective response surface, any 
combination of affect can be located on a plane defined by PA (x-axis) and NA (y-axis). For each 
combination of PA and NA, the corresponding level of satisfaction can be plotted on a third axis 
(z). When satisfaction is plotted over all combinations of PA and NA, an affective response 
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surface is produced like “a blanket suspended in three-dimensional space” (Tov & Lee, 2016; see 
Figure 1, top).  
Describing the Affective Response Surface 
Two major features of the affective response surface are the slopes of congruence and 
discrepancy. Figure 1 (Bottom) shows where these gradients run along the affective response 
surface.  
Affective discrepancy. The line of affective discrepancy runs from Point B to Point D in 
Figure 1 and describes how daily satisfaction varies from situations where NA is prevalent (Point 
B) to situations where PA is prevalent (Point D). Satisfaction is expected to be lowest on days 
dominated by NA and highest on days dominated by PA (Bradburn, 1969; Suh, Diener, Oishi & 
Triandis, 1998) Assuming that PA is plotted on the x-axis and NA is plotted on the y-axis in 
RSM, this will result in a positive value for the affective discrepancy slope. 
Affective congruence. The line of affective congruence runs from Point C to Point A in 
Figure 1 and is perpendicular to the line of affective discrepancy. It represents all points on the 
affective response surface where levels of PA and NA are subjectively rated as equivalent. The 
slope of affective congruence describes how satisfaction changes from situations where low 
levels of PA and NA are experienced (Point C; PA and NA are both 0) to situations where high 
levels of PA and NA are experienced (Point A; PA and NA are both 100). Figures 2 through 4 
illustrate that the sign of affective congruence slope indicate whether PA or NA (or neither) are 
weighted more in judgments of satisfaction. In the case of affect balance, the slope is zero 
(Figure 2). If negativity dominance holds, the slope will be negative (Figure 3). Finally, if 
positivity dominance holds, the slope will be positive (Figure 4).  
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Moderators of the Slopes of Affective Congruence and Discrepancy 
Individual difference moderators (savouring, catastrophizing, and rumination) of the 
congruence and discrepancy slopes can also introduced to the model. In the case of response 
surface modelling, the moderator variable (W) is entered as a predictor in the polynomial 
regression model, along with product terms reflecting the interaction of the moderator with PA 
and NA. The slopes of congruence and discrepancy and their interaction with individual 
difference moderators are tested by defining linear contrasts of the effects of PA and NA. Note 
also that because daily affect and satisfaction reports were nested within participants, the RSM 
was embedded within a two-level multilevel model (Level 1 = daily variables; Level 2 = 
individual difference variables). For detailed formulas and discussion of how the relevant slopes 
are operationalised, please refer to Appendix 2. 
Results 
Data Screening  
Two hundred and nine participants were initially recruited for the experience sampling 
study. Out of this initial total, five participants did not complete the experience sampling phase 
(Phase 2, see section on Procedure) and were subsequently excluded from the analysis. Out of 
the remaining two hundred and four participants, fourteen participants did not provide complete 
sequences of daytime, evening and end-of-day measurements of their affect and satisfaction. 
These participants were also excluded from the analysis, resulting in the final tally of 190 
participants who provided a total of 645 observations in Phase 2. Modeling the affective response 
surface required participants to have data for daytime affect, evening affect, and satisfaction in 
the same day. If participants missed any of these measures, their data from that day were 
excluded. On average, each participant completed 3.4 full days in Phase 2. 
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Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
To facilitate interpretation across variables, all scores were rescaled to range from 0 to 
100 (a score of 50 represents a score at the midpoint of the response scale). Table 1 displays the 
means and standard deviations of variables used in the present study. On average participants 
reported experiencing higher levels of PA than NA during daytime (M = 50.03 vs M = 19.85) as 
well as in the evening (M = 52.25 vs M = 20.26). Sample participants on average were 
moderately high on savouring (M = 67.64) and rumination (M = 67.47), and moderately low on 
catastrophizing (M = 40.63). Table 2 also displays the frequency distribution of the individual 
difference scores of savouring, catastrophizing and rumination among the 190 participants.  
Frequency Distribution of Positive and Negative Affect for Daily-averaged, Daytime and 
Evening Affective Response Surfaces 
Tables 3 – 5 display the cross tabulation of PA and NA for daily-averaged, daytime and 
evening response surfaces, based on the 645 observations during Phase 2. PA and NA scores 
have also been rescaled to range from 0 to 100 to facilitate interpretation. Following Tov and Lee 
(2016)’s approach, I define cases of affective congruence (when PA is equal to NA) as when PA 
and NA scores were within 10 points of each other. This classification is only used in this section 
to describe the joint distribution of PA and NA. Subsequent analyses utilising PA and NA scores 
analysed them as continuous data free from any grouping. 
When daily-averaged PA and NA were cross-tabulated, PA was greater than NA in 77.4% 
cases, equal to NA in 9.5 % of cases and less than NA in 13.2 % of cases (see Table 3). When 
daytime PA and NA were cross-tabulated, PA was greater than NA in 73.2 % cases, equal to NA 
in 13.5 % of cases and less than NA in 13.3 % of cases (see Table 4). When evening PA and NA 
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were cross-tabulated, PA was greater than NA in 73.5 % cases, equal to NA in 11.3 % of cases 
and less than NA in 15.2 % of cases (see Table 5).  
Average, Daytime and Evening Affective Response Surface Models (RSMs) of End-of-Day 
Satisfaction 
To test Hypothesis 1, daily-averaged PA (NA) scores were computed by averaging the 
daytime and evening ratings of PA (NA). These scores represent participants’ average level of PA 
and NA on a single day (daily-level affect).  Each participant’s mean level of PA and NA (across 
the five-day period) were also entered in the model to control for person-level differences in 
affective experience. Table 6 displays the daily-level and person-level regression coefficients of 
the average, daytime and evening affective response surface models of end-of-day satisfaction. 
For each model, the slopes of affective discrepancy and congruence are also computed. When 
end-of-day satisfaction was modelled as a function of average PA and NA, average PA and NA 
independently exerted influences on end-of-day satisfaction (Refer to Table 6, model column 
“Average”; PA: b = 0.35, t = 3.37, p =.001, NA: b = -0.35, t = -2.81, p =.005). The affective 
discrepancy slope of the resultant response surface (Figure 5) was significantly positive (b = 
0.70, t = 8.29, p = .000). Days where individuals reported a preponderance of PA over NA were 
associated with higher levels of satisfaction at the end of the day. However, the affective 
congruence slope was not significantly different from zero. On days where individuals reported 
experiencing subjectively equivalent levels of PA and NA, the influence of PA on end-of-day 
satisfaction was not weighted more than that of NA. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the results are 
consistent with the affect balance model (not positivity dominance). 
 To test Hypothesis 2, end-of-day satisfaction was separately modelled as a function of 
daytime versus evening affect (see Table 6). Contrary to the prediction that positivity dominance 
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would be stronger for daytime than evening affect, the slope of congruence was not significant in 
either case (daytime: Figure 6; b = 0.12, t = 0.76, p = .45; evening: Figure 7; b = 0.08, t = 0.70, p 
= .483). The 95% confidence interval (CI) for the daytime congruence slope [-0.20; 0.44] 
overlapped with the evening congruence slope [-0.15; 0.32]. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported. 
Moderating effects of Cognitive Habits (Savouring Beliefs, Catastrophizing and 
Rumination) on Affective Response Surfaces 
To test Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5, daily-averaged PA and NA were again entered as 
predictors of end-of-day satisfaction (see Table 7). Each participant’s mean level of PA and NA 
(across the five-day period) were also entered in the model to control for person-level differences 
in affective experience. In addition, for Hypothesis 3 person-level scores of savouring were 
entered as a predictor into the regression model along with the corresponding product terms. For 
Hypothesis 4, catastrophizing scores were entered as the predictor. For Hypothesis 5, rumination 
scores were used.  Table 7 displays the daily-level, person-level and cross-level regression 
coefficients of the daily-averaged affective response surface models. Each model column 
includes the affective discrepancy and congruence slopes at mean levels of the moderator 
(savouring, catastrophizing, or rumination), as well as moderating effects on the affective 
discrepancy and congruence slopes.  
Hypothesis 3A and 3B are that savouring would moderate the slopes of affective 
congruence and discrepancy. As indicated in the bottom row of Table 7, these hypotheses were not 
supported. There were no significant moderating effects of savouring on the slopes of affective 
congruence (b = 0.02, t = 1.29, p = .197) or discrepancy (b = 0.00, t = 0.18, p = .857). 
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Hypothesis 4A and 4B are that catastrophizing moderates the slopes of affective 
congruence and discrepancy. There was a significant moderating effect of catastrophizing on the 
affective congruence slope (b = -0.02, t = -2.05, p = .041). I took a region of significance 
approach to estimate the levels of catastrophizing at which the simple slopes of affective 
congruence would become significant but did not find any. At the lowest observed score for 
catastrophizing = .00, the slope of affective congruence was not significantly different from zero 
(Figure 8, left; b = 0.73, t = 1.75, p = .081).  At higher observed scores for catastrophizing (even 
up to the observed maximum of 87.50), the slope of affective congruence was also not significant 
(Figure 8, right; b = 0.11, t = 0.51, p = .614). Thus, Hypothesis 4A was not supported. Contrary 
to Hypothesis 4B, there was no moderating effect of catastrophizing on the slope of affective 
discrepancy (b = -0.00, t = -0.73, p = .466). 
Hypotheses 5A and 5B are that rumination would moderate the slope of affective 
congruence and discrepancy. There was a significant moderating effect of rumination on the 
affective congruence slope (b = -0.02, t = -1.98, p = .048). Using the same region of significance 
approach, I did not find any levels of rumination at which the simple slopes of affective 
congruence would become significant within the observed range. At the minimum observed 
score for rumination (0.00) the slope of congruence was not significantly different from zero 
(Figure 9, left; b = 1.45, t = 1.91, p = .056). At higher scores (up to the observed maximum of 
100.00) the slope of congruence was also not significantly different from zero (Figure 9, right; b 
= 0.53, t = 0.245, p = .806). Thus Hypothesis 5A was not supported. Contrary to Hypothesis 5B, 
rumination did not moderate the slope of affective discrepancy (b = 0.01, t = 1.34, p = .181). 
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Comparison of Moderating effects of Cognitive Habits on Daytime versus Evening 
Affective Response Surfaces 
To test Hypotheses 6A-F, end-of-day satisfaction was separately modelled as a function 
of daytime and evening response surfaces. Each participant’s mean level of PA and NA (across 
the five-day period) were also entered in both daytime and evening models to control for person-
level differences in affective experience. In addition, savouring, catastrophizing and rumination 
were separately entered as predictors in the daytime and evening regression models along with 
their corresponding product terms. Tables 4, 5 and 6 displays the daily-level, person-level and 
cross-level interaction regression coefficients of the daytime and evening response surfaces. 
Table 8 also displays models testing the moderating effect of savouring on daytime and evening 
slopes. Likewise, Table 9 and 10 allow us to similarly compare the moderating effects of 
catastrophizing and rumination respectively. 
Moderating effects on affective congruence. There was a significant moderating effect 
of savouring on the daytime affective slope of congruence (Table 8; b = 0.03, t = 2.86, p = .004).  
At savouring levels lower than 38, the slope of affective congruence became significantly 
negative (Figure 10, bottom left; b = -0.62, t = -1.99, p = .047). At savouring levels of 69 or 
higher the slope of affective congruence became significantly positive (Figure 10, bottom right; b 
= 0.36, t = 1.98, p = .049). In contrast, there were no significant moderating effects of savouring 
on the evening slopes of affective congruence (b = 0.00, t = 0.56, p = .575). With regards to 
Hypothesis 6A, there is some support from evidence suggesting the moderating influence of 
savouring on affective congruence is present only on the daytime (versus evening) slope of 
affective congruence.  
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There was no significant moderating effect of catastrophizing on the daytime affective 
slope of congruence (Table 9; b = -0.01, t = -1.84, p = .066). There were also no significant 
moderating effects of catastrophizing on the evening slopes of affective congruence (b = -0.00, t 
= -0.69, p = .49). With regards to Hypothesis 6B, there is insufficient evidence to support the 
idea that the moderating effect of catastrophizing is stronger in daytime (versus evening) slope of 
affective congruence. 
As indicated by the second last row of Table 10, there were no significant moderating 
effects of rumination on the daytime slope of affective congruence (b = -0.02, t = -1.64, p = .102) 
or on the evening slope of affective congruence (b = -0.01, t = -1.09 p = .277). With regards to 
Hypothesis 6C, there is insufficient evidence supporting the idea that the moderating effect of 
rumination is stronger in daytime (versus evening) slope of affective congruence.  
Moderating effects on affective discrepancy. As indicated by the bottom row of Table 
8, savouring did not moderate the daytime slope of affective discrepancy (b = -0.01, t = -1.24, p 
= .216). Savouring also did not moderate the evening slope of affective discrepancy (b = 0.00, t = 
0.70, p = .482). With regards to Hypothesis 6D there is insufficient evidence to support the idea 
that the moderating effect of savouring is stronger in the daytime (versus evening) slope of 
affective discrepancy. 
As indicated by the bottom row of Table 9, catastrophizing did not moderate the daytime 
slope of affective discrepancy (b = -0.00, t = -0.18, p = .854). Catastrophizing also did not 
moderate the evening slope of affective discrepancy (b = -0.00, t = -1.58, p = .114). With regards 
to Hypothesis 6E, there is insufficient evidence to support the idea that the moderating effect of 
catastrophizing is stronger in daytime (versus evening) slope of affective discrepancy. 
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There was a significant moderating effect of rumination on the daytime slope of 
discrepancy (Table 10; b = 0.01, t = 2.90, p = .004). At rumination levels of 7 and below (Figure 
11, bottom left) the daytime slope of affective discrepancy was negative (b = -0.56, t = -1.98, p 
= .049). At rumination scores of 87 and higher, the daytime slope of affective discrepancy 
became positive (Figure 11, bottom right; b = 0.37, t = 1.99, p = .047). Rumination did not 
moderate the evening slope of affective discrepancy (b = 0.00, t = 0.21, p = .835). With regards 
to Hypothesis 6F, there is some support from evidence suggesting that the moderating effect of 
rumination is present only in the daytime (versus evening) slope of affective discrepancy. 
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Discussion 
Reassessing The Prevalence of Positivity Dominance on The Affective Slope of Congruence 
The pattern of results is generally consistent with accounts supporting the prevalence of 
affect balance in the affective slope of congruence instead of positivity dominance, which is 
contrary to earlier findings that found support for the latter (Tov & Lee, 2016). Hypothesis 1 is 
not supported when end-of-day satisfaction is modelled as a joint function of PA and NA 
averaged across the day. The affective slope of congruence in the resultant affective response 
surface did not have a significantly positive slope.  
Despite the lack of support for Hypothesis 1, I considered the possibility that positivity 
dominance may have been present during some but not all parts of the day but was masked since 
a daily summary of affect was used in analyses. To investigate if this was the case, I decomposed 
the analysis on the daily-averaged affective response surface into two analyses, one for the 
daytime affective response surface and one for the evening affective response surface.  
Still, I failed to find positivity dominance in either daytime or evening affective slopes of 
congruence. Positivity dominance was not demonstrated for either daytime and evening surfaces 
making it hard to comment whether positivity dominance is stronger on either surface. This 
finding was contrary to Hypothesis 2  
 However, some patterns were consistent with the influence of NA on satisfaction fading 
more quickly, as seen when end-of-day satisfaction is modelled as a function of daytime PA and 
NA. Looking at the second row in the “Daytime” column of Table 6, the independent  effect of 
daytime NA on end-of-day satisfaction is not significant (b = -0.13, t = -1.35, p = .177). In 
contrast the main effect of evening NA on end-of-day satisfaction (Table 6, second row in 
“Evening” column) is significant (b = -0.22, t = -3.45, p = .001).  
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Failing to find evidence in support of positivity dominance in the affective slope of 
congruence, even after analysing the relationship between affect and daily satisfaction separately 
for daytime versus evening affect, I considered if positivity dominance on the slope of affective 
congruence could be a function of individual differences instead. I proposed three cognitive 
habits deemed relevant in how affective congruence would relate to satisfaction differently 
across individuals: savouring, catastrophizing and rumination.  
When examining the daily-averaged affective response surfaces, individual differences in 
savouring, catastrophizing and rumination did not appear to affect whether positivity dominance 
would appear on the slope of affective congruence. I did not find a moderating effect of 
savouring on the slope of affective congruence. I found a moderating effect of catastrophizing 
and of rumination on the slope of affective congruence, but subsequent analyses failed to find 
individual difference levels on these two variables that were associated with affective 
congruence slopes that were significantly different from zero. 
However, some evidence of moderating effects was observed when the analyses were 
decomposed into daytime versus evening affective response surfaces. I found that any 
moderating effects on the slope of affective congruence were limited to daytime response 
surfaces only. Only savouring moderated the daytime slope of affective congruence. I observed 
that individuals who had above average levels of savouring beliefs (scoring 69 and above) 
demonstrated positivity dominance in the congruence slope of their daytime affective response 
surfaces. Individuals who scored below average levels of savouring beliefs (scoring 38 and 
below) demonstrated negativity dominance in the congruence slope of their daytime affective 
response surface. I am cautious in the interpretation of the negative slope for low savourers due 
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to the fact that the data collected comprised few people who scored low on savouring. Despite 
this, no other moderating effects on affective congruence were observed. 
While the present study did not find support for the positivity dominance model, it does 
not present confirmatory evidence for the affect balance model. It remains possible that positivity 
dominance is the true model but that the present methodology did not present a powerful enough 
test to detect it.  
Although the person-level sample size is quite high (N = 190), the daily-level sample size 
(N = 645) could be improved. On average ,participants in the present study only provided 3.4 
days of affect and satisfaction measurements and this might have limited the ability of the 
hypothesis testing to detect a significant slope of affective congruence if it were present. 
Previous studies assessed individuals over a period of 10 to 21 days or occasions (Tov & Lee, 
2016). The higher number of observations per person translates into more statistical power which 
would be important for testing for positivity dominance and also critical for testing affect 
balance. The affect balance model relies on a non-significant result (the absence of a significant 
slope of congruence) for support. However, a non-significant result obtained from an 
underpowered test could have been caused by low statistical power instead of a true absence of 
slope. Thus, having a study with high statistical power is important to provide stronger support 
for the affect balance model. As such, results of the present research are inconclusive as to 
whether positivity dominance or affect balance is the true model describing the relationship 
between affect and daily satisfaction. 
In addition to posing problems for test power, the low number of observations per 
participants on average may not have provided a reliable estimate of people’s tendency to weight 
positive or negative affect. 17 participants had only 1 full-day sequence of daytime, evening and 
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end-of-day measurements of their affect and satisfaction. This also further reduced the sample 
size available to estimate random effects for the PA and NA slopes. Relatedly, the models 
developed often did not have enough information to estimate the random effects of PA and NA. 
However, when these effects were computable, they were generally not significant. As a result, 
the models presented only estimated the random effect of the intercept. Future work should 
consider a longer experience sampling duration to improve the estimation of the random effects 
for PA and NA. 
Role of Memory in The Joint Influence of Affect on Satisfaction 
At first glance the lack of support for Hypothesis 1 is inconsistent with past literature 
(Holmes, 1970; Matlin & Stang, 1978; Taylor 1991, Tov & Lee, 2016) which would predict that 
on days where PA and NA are experienced as subjectively equivalent levels, PA would exert a 
greater influence than NA on daily satisfaction, giving rise to positivity dominance.  
In view of this, it may be relevant to note how the current study differs in its 
measurement approach of affect. Previous studies investigating the influence of mood on 
satisfaction judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Tov & Lee, 2016) measured affect and 
satisfaction during the same time period. Participant’s assessed both their affective experience 
and satisfaction at the end of the day. In contrast, the current study compares the joint relation 
between affect and satisfaction when affect was measured during the daytime and evening and 
satisfaction was assessed at the end of the day.  
The lack of positivity dominance when daily-averaged affect is instead used to predict 
end-of-day satisfaction suggests a discrepancy between how positively and negatively people 
recollect their day to be versus how positively and negatively it is when averaged across different 
assessments during the day. Possibly one way these differ is that the use of daily-averaged PA 
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and NA as predictors may include affective events that may or may not have influenced how 
participants ultimately felt on the whole. While these events might influence PA or NA at the 
half-day assessments, they may be disregarded or downplayed when affect is assessed at the end 
of day. The present research only required participants to report their affect during the Phase 2 
surveys but not the specific events that may have contributed to participants’ affect at the time. 
Future research efforts might benefit from the reporting of specific events during time of affect 
measurement so that the degree of dependence between daily events and experienced affect can 
be better understood. 
While the use of affect estimates based on an average across two measurements can be 
considered an improvement as it reduces the risk of memory biases from single point of affect 
recall, this method of obtaining an estimate of affect might not capture how people actually 
process affective events toward daily satisfaction judgments. The present method takes the 
arithmetic average of two affect measurements: this assumes that individuals weigh daytime 
affect and evening affect equally. In reality this may not be true. It could be the case that all 
individuals in general tend to weight daytime affect more than evening affect or vice versa. It 
could also be the case that individuals differ from each other in this respect with some weighing 
daytime affect more when judging daily satisfaction and others weighing evening affect more. It 
is also possible that differences in weighing affect from different times of the day exist even 
within individuals: on some days an individual could weight the influence of daytime affect on 
satisfaction and on some days evening affect could be weighed more. Even as Hypothesis 1 
remains unsupported in the present research, the process of investigating it has opened up more 
fundamental questions about how affect is processed and related to satisfaction judgments. 
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Beyond citing differences in how affect is measured and considered in analyses, the lack 
of support for Hypothesis 1 might also hint that positivity dominance may depend on how people 
remember their affective experiences and suggest the key role of memory in processing affective 
information into satisfaction judgments. This would agree with previous research demonstrating 
that memories of affective events contribute towards the formulation satisfaction judgments 
(Schimmack, Diener, & Oishi, 2002). 
Another potential factor preventing positivity dominance from being observed in the 
present research could be that mechanisms supposedly underlying it such as the fading affect 
bias (FAB) and the mobilisation-minimisation process required more time to manifest their 
effects on the slope of congruence. The older the affective event (relative to the time of 
satisfaction judgment formation) the stronger the impact of FAB and mobilisation-minimization 
on the slope of congruence is expected to be. However, the timing of the earliest affect ratings 
(2pm) might not have provided sufficient delay for any positivity dominance to emerge. 
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Appendix 1: Measures 
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007) 
Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided on what you think after  
the experience of threatening or stressful life events. Write the number in the blank that best describes  
your own opinion of what is generally true for you. 









1. I continually think how horrible the situation has been  
2. I keep thinking about how terrible the experience was 
3. I often think that what I have experienced is the worst that can happen to a person 




1. I dwell upon the feelings the situation has evoked in me  
2. I am preoccupied with what I think and feel about what I have experienced  
3. I often think about how I feel about what I have experienced 
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Savouring Beliefs Inventory (Bryant, 2003) 
Using the scale below as a guide, please indicate how much you agree with each of the following 
statements. 
 













1. Before a good thing happens, I look forward to it in ways that give me pleasure in the 
present. 
2. It's hard for me to hang onto a good feeling for very long. 
3. I enjoy looking back on happy times from my past. 
4. I don't like to look forward to good times too much before they happen. 
5. I know how to make the most of a good time. 
6. I don't like to look back at good times too much after they've taken place. 
7. I feel a joy of anticipation when I think about upcoming good things. 
8. When it comes to enjoying myself, I'm my own "worst enemy." 
9. I can make myself feel good by remembering pleasant events from my past. 
10. For me, anticipating what upcoming good events will be like is basically a waste of 
time. 
11. When something good happens, I can make my enjoyment of it last longer by thinking 
or doing certain things. 
12. When I reminisce about pleasant memories, I often start to feel sad or disappointed. 
13. I can enjoy pleasant events in my mind before they actually occur. 
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14. I can't seem to capture the joy of happy moments. 
15. I like to store memories of fun times that I go through so that I can recall them later. 
16. It's hard for me to get very excited about fun times before they actually take place. 
17. I feel fully able to appreciate good things that happen to me. 
18. I find that thinking about good times from the past is basically a waste of time. 
19. I can make myself feel good by imagining what a happy time that is about to happen 
will be like. 
20. I don't enjoy things as much as I should. 
21. It's easy for me to rekindle the joy from pleasant memories. 
22. When I think about a pleasant event before it happens, I often start to feel uneasy or 
uncomfortable. 
23. It's easy for me to enjoy myself when I want to. 
24. For me, once a fun time is over and gone, it's best not to think about it. 
 
Demographic Variables 
For each question, please circle the option that best applies to you. 
1. What is your sex?    0 = Male  1 = Female 




AFFECT AND SATISFACTION 
Half-day Affect (adapted from Diener, Wirtz, Tov, Kim-Prieto, Choi, Oishi, & Biswas-
Diener, 2010) 
From _______ to _______, how much did you feel … 
  not at all  extremely 
1. Good  1 2 3 4 5  
2. Bad  1 2 3 4 5  
3. Happy  1 2 3 4 5  
4. Sad  1 2 3 4 5  
5. Pleased  1 2 3 4 5  
6. Upset  1 2 3 4 5  
7. Positive  1 2 3 4 5  
8. Negative  1 2 3 4 5  
End-of-day Satisfaction (Tov & Lee, 2016) 
Using the 1 – 7 scale below, please indicate your agreement with each item. 
 













1. Today I felt very satisfied. 
2. Today was an excellent day. 
3. Today went according to my expectations. 
4. Today I felt very dissatisfied. 
5.  Today was a terrible day 
6. Today did not go according to my expectations. 
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Appendix 2: Multilevel Approach to Response Surface Modeling 
The data collected from experience sampling responses follows a multilevel structure: 
responses are nested within participants and variation occurs both within-person at the day level 
and between-persons at the person level. In creating the affective response surface relating PA 
and NA to satisfaction, the affect and satisfaction ratings will be specified in a multilevel model 
(level 1: daily level, level 2: person level). This means that the affective response surface is 
modelled at level 1 by the following equation: 
SAT = b0 + b1L1PA + b2L1NA + b3L1PA2 + b4 (L1PA*NA) + b5 L1NA2 + e   
Here, at Level 1 (day level, L1) SAT is satisfaction with the day, b0 is the intercept, b1 
represents the effect of L1PA on SAT, and b2 represents the effect of L1NA. Coefficient b3 
represents the non-linear effect of L1PA and coefficient b5 represents the non-linear effect of 
L1NA. Coefficient b4 represents the interaction effect of L1PA and L1NA. “e” denotes the 
residual variance unexplained by the predictors entered in this equation. 
In RSM, the slope of affective discrepancy at L1 can be calculated as the difference in the 
effects of PA and NA on satisfaction (i.e., b1 - b2). This slope can be tested for statistical 
significance1 to make inferences on what happens to satisfaction as PA rises and NA falls, or as 
NA rises and PA falls. Given that we plot PA on the x-axis, NA on the y-axis and satisfaction on 
the z-axis (see Figure 1), a significantly positive slope of discrepancy means that satisfaction is 
rising as we move from Point B to Point D (i.e., days with a preponderance of NA to days with a 
preponderance of PA).  
                                                 
 
1 Shanock et al. (2010, see Table 4) provide the standard errors required to test the slope of discrepancy 
(and congruence) for statistical significance. 
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The effects of affective congruence (how PA and NA jointly affect satisfaction when both 
are rated at equal levels) can be calculated as the sum of the effects of PA and NA on satisfaction 
(i.e., b1 + b2) and can also be tested for statistical significance. A zero or non-significant slope of 
congruence means satisfaction levels stay the same as we move along the line of congruence 
from Point C to Point A, reflecting affect balance (Figure 2). A significantly negative slope of 
congruence means satisfaction levels fall as we move along the line of congruence from Point C 
to Point A, reflecting negativity dominance (Figure 3). A significantly positive slope of 
congruence means satisfaction levels rise as we move along the line of congruence from Point C 
to Point A, reflecting positivity dominance (Figure 4).  
At Level 2 (person level, L2), the level 1 intercept (b0) is modelled as: 
b0 = g00 + g01L2PA + g02L2NA + g03L2PA2 + g04(L2PA*L2NA) + g05(L2NA2) + g06W + 
u0 
At the person level (L2), the L1 intercept is modelled as a function of average PA and NA 
for each person (L2PA and L2NA)—this controls for person-level differences in mean affect. A 
L2 individual difference variable (e.g., savouring) is also entered as a predictor (W) of 
satisfaction and the effect is captured by g06. 
 In addition, the moderating effect of individual differences in cognitive habits is tested by 
entering savouring, catastrophizing, or rumination as a L2 predictor (W) of the slopes for PA, 
NA, their nonlinear effects, and their interaction.  
b1 = g10 + g11W + u1 
b2 = g20 + g21W + u2 
b3 = g30 + g31W + u3 
b4 = g40 + g41W + u4 
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b5 = g50 + g51W + u5 
The slope of discrepancy (b1 – b2) can now be tested as a function of individual 
differences variable (W) through the following equation,  
(g10 + g11W) – (g20 + g21W) 
The above equation can be rewritten as: 
(g11 – g21) * W + g10 – g20. 
In the above equation, the component (g10 – g20) reflects the average slope of discrepancy 
(i.e., b1 – b2). The component “(g11 – g21) * W” reflects the moderating effect of an individual 
difference variable W on the slope of discrepancy. This approach is similar to the one suggested 
by Edwards (2002). 
In a similar fashion the slope of congruence can also be tested for the moderating effects 
of an individual difference variable (W) through the following equation,  
(g10 + g11W) + (g20 + g21W),  
which can be rewritten: 
(g11 + g21) * W + g10 + g20. 
The component (g10 + g20) in the above equation reflects the average slope of congruence 
(i.e., b1 + b2). The component “(g11 + g21) * W” reflects the moderating effect of an individual 
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Appendix 3: Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
Variables M SD 
Savouring 67.64 12.98 
Catastrophizing 40.63 19.48 
Rumination 67.47 16.91 
Daytime PA 50.03 23.38 
Daytime NA 19.85 20.76 
Evening PA 52.25 24.17 







EDSAT 62.90 20.61 
 Note. Responses were rescaled to range from 0 to 100 prior to computing means and standard 
deviations. EDSAT = End-of-Day Satisfaction.
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Table 2. Frequency Distribution of Individual Difference Variables 
    Score Range       
Variable 




















Savouring 0 0 1 3 15 30 51 59 26 5 190 
Catastrophizing 11 18 26 43 44 16 18 6 8 0 190 
Rumination 1 1 2 8 23 19 51 38 32 15 190 
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Table 3. Frequency Distribution of Positive and Negative Affect for Daily-averaged Affective Response Surfaces 
  PA   



















0 - 10 4 8 16 22 45 30 33 56 18 25 257 
10.01 - 20 0 5 9 17 27 17 19 15 5 2 116 
20.01 - 30 3 6 14 24 19 14 8 11 2 0 101 
30.01 - 40 2 4 8 13 12 6 12 6 0 1 64 
40.01 - 50 3 0 8 17 20 16 3 1 0 0 68 
50.01 - 60 0 3 2 4 5 4 0 0 0 0 18 
60.01 - 70 3 2 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 12 
70.01 - 80 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
80.01 - 90 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
90.01 - 100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
            
Total 18 29 61 100 130 89 76 89 25 28 645 
            
   N   % Total          
PA > NA 499 77.4          
PA = NA 61 9.5          
PA < NA 85 13.2                   
Note. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect. Cases along the line of affective congruence are in bold; those along the line of 
affective discrepancy are underlined. 
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Table 4. Frequency Distribution of Positive and Negative Affect for Daytime Affective Response Surfaces 
  PA   



















0 - 10 9 7 19 28 49 22 29 58 19 25 265 
10.01 - 20 4 9 7 28 27 12 21 14 4 3 129 
20.01 - 30 2 1 14 8 27 5 5 14 2 2 80 
30.01 - 40 3 7 5 25 9 6 8 4 0 1 68 
40.01 - 50 3 2 4 8 26 3 5 1 0 0 52 
50.01 - 60 1 3 2 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 14 
60.01 - 70 2 2 5 8 2 1 1 0 0 0 21 
70.01 - 80 3 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 
80.01 - 90 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
90.01 - 100 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
            
Total 31 34 58 110 144 52 69 91 25 31 645 
            
   N   % Total          
PA > NA 472 73.2          
PA = NA 87 13.5          
PA < NA 86 13.3                   
Note. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect. Cases along the line of affective congruence are in bold; those along the line of 
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Table 5. Frequency Distribution of Positive and Negative Affect for Evening Affective Response Surfaces 
  PA   



















0 - 10 4 9 15 16 62 8 28 64 18 33 257 
10.01 - 20 3 10 10 13 27 10 15 25 6 3 122 
20.01 - 30 4 4 14 14 16 7 5 26 3 1 94 
30.01 - 40 3 5 8 18 10 2 6 4 1 1 58 
40.01 - 50 3 6 13 8 21 5 5 3 1 0 65 
50.01 - 60 0 3 0 2 4 3 0 1 0 0 13 
60.01 - 70 2 2 3 6 3 2 2 0 0 0 20 
70.01 - 80 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 
80.01 - 90 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
90.01 - 100 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
            
Total 24 40 68 79 144 37 61 124 29 39 645 
            
   N   % Total          
PA > NA 474 73.5          
PA = NA 73 11.3          
PA < NA 98 15.2                   
Note. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect. Cases along the line of affective congruence are in bold; those along the line of 
affective discrepancy are underlined. 
Table 6. Average, Daytime and Evening Affective Response Surface Models (RSMs) of End-of-Day Satisfaction 
  Average   Daytime   Evening  
Predictor b SE t b SE t b SE t 
Daily Level (Level 1)          
PA 0.35** 0.11 3.37 0.25** 0.08 2.99 0.31** 0.07 4.72 
NA -0.35** 0.12 -2.81 -0.13 0.09 -1.35 -0.23** 0.07 -3.41 
PA2 0.00 0.00 1.04 0.00 0.00 1.27 0.00 0.00 0.51 
PA x NA 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.36 
NA2 -0.00 0.00 -0.73 0.00 0.00 0.19 -0.00 0.00 -0.16 
          
Person Level (Level 2)          
PA -0.00 0.15 -0.02 0.11 0.15 0.68 -0.03 0.12 -0.23 
NA -0.07 -0.18 -0.40 -0.11 0.16 -0.69 -0.22 0.16 -1.38 
PA2 -0.01* 0.00 -2.37 -0.00 0.00 -1.67 -0.00 0.00 -1.53 
PA x NA -0.00 0.00 -1.07 -0.00 0.00 -1.19 -0.00 0.00 -1.42 
NA2 0.00 0.00 1.22 0.00 0.00 1.24 0.00 0.00 0.41 
          
RSM Slope          
Affective Congruence 0.01 0.21 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.76 0.08 0.12 0.70 
Affective Discrepancy 0.70** 0.08 8.29 0.38** 0.07 5.38 0.54** 0.06 9.16 
Note. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. 
Table 7. Moderating effects of Cognitive Habits on Average Affective Response Surfaces 
 W = Savouring W = Catastrophizing W = Rumination 
Predictor b SE t b SE t b SE t 
Daily Level (Level 1)          
PA 0.34** 0.11 3.23 0.41** 0.11 3.78 0.37** 0.11 3.47 
NA -0.35** 0.13 -2.74 -0.29* 0.13 -2.31 -0.31* 0.13 -2.46 
PA2 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 1.22 0.00 0.00 1.02 
PA x NA 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.27 
NA2 -0.00 0.00 -0.61 -0.00 0.00 -0.38 -0.00 0.00 -0.56 
          
Person Level (Level 2)          
PA -0.00 0.16 -0.03 0.03 0.15 0.19 0.03 0.15 0.17 
NA -0.05 0.18 -0.29 -0.01 0.18 -0.07 -0.07 0.18 -0.39 
PA2 -0.01* 0.00 -2.37 -0.01 0.00 -2.28 -0.01* 0.00 -2.26 
PA x NA -0.00 0.00 -0.94 -0.00 0.00 -0.72 -0.00 0.00 -0.84 
NA2 0.00 0.00 1.23 0.00 0.00 -2.41 0.00 0.00 1.33 
W 0.31* 1.22 2.50 -0.15* 0.073 -2.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.18 
          
Cross Level Interactions          
W* PA 0.01 0.01 1.47 -0.01* 0.00 -2.41 -0.01 0.00 -1.46 
W* NA 0.02 0.01 0.99 -0.01 0.00 -1.43 -0.01* 0.01 -2.11 
W* PA2 0.00 0.00 0.12 -0.00 0.00 -1.32 0.00 0.00 0.52 
W* PA x NA 0.00 0.00 1.16 -0.00* 0.00 -2.37 -0.00 0.00 -1.36 
W* NA2 0.00 0.00 0.23 -0.00 0.00 -1.11 -0.00** 0.00 -2.69 
 
Table 7. Moderating effects of Cognitive Habits on Average Affective Response Surfaces (continued) 
 W = Savouring W = Catastrophizing W = Rumination 
Predictor b SE t b SE t b SE t 
Average RSM Slopes          
Affective Congruence -0.00 0.22 -0.02 0.11 0.22 0.51 0.05 0.22 0.25 
Affective Discrepancy 0.69** 0.09 8.03 0.70** 0.09 8.20 0.68** 0.09 7.70 
          
Moderating effect of W on RSM 
Slopes 
         
Affective Congruence 0.02 0.01 1.29 -0.02* 0.01 -2.05 -0.02* 0.01 -1.98 
Affective Discrepancy 0.00 0.01 0.18 -0.00 0.00 -0.73 0.01 0.00 1.34 
Note. W = moderating effect of cognitive habit such as savouring, catastrophizing, or rumination (refer to respective column header).  
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01.
Table 8. Moderating effects of Savouring on Daytime and Evening Affective Response 
Surfaces 
 Daytime Evening 
Predictor b SE t b SE t 
Daily Level (Level 1)       
PA 0.34** 0.09 3.82 0.29** 0.07 4.16 
NA -0.02 0.10 -0.21 -0.24** 0.07 -3.47 
PA2 0.00 0.00 1.44 0.00 0.00 0.24 
PA x NA 0.00 0.00 1.68 -0.00 0.00 -0.05 
NA2 0.00 0.00 1.39 -0.00 0.00 -0.41 
       
Person Level (Level 2)       
PA 0.04 0.16 0.29 -0.03 0.12 -0.25 
NA -0.17 0.17 -1.03 -0.21 0.16 -1.28 
PA2 -0.00 0.00 -1.60 -0.00 0.00 -1.63 
PA x NA -0.01 0.00 -1.41 -0.00 0.00 -1.20 
NA2 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.43 
W 0.43** 0.13 3.41 0.28** 0.11 2.64 
       
Cross Level Interactions       
W* PA 0.01* 0.01 2.42 0.00 0.00 0.90 
W* NA 0.02** 0.01 2.77 0.00 0.00 0.14 
W* PA2 -0.00 0.00 -0.80 0.00 0.00 0.30 
W* PA x NA 0.00* 0.00 2.52 0.00 0.00 0.03 
W* NA2 0.00* 0.00 2.19 -0.00 0.00 -1.19 
       
Average RSM Slopes       
Affective Congruence 0.31 0.18 1.80 0.05 0.12 -0.11 
Affective Discrepancy 0.36** 0.07 4.91 0.52** 0.06 8.63 
       
Moderating effect of W on RSM Slopes       
Affective Congruence 0.03** 0.01 2.86 0.00 0.01 0.56 
Affective Discrepancy -0.01 0.01 -1.24 0.00 0.00 0.70 
Note. p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01.
Table 9. Moderating effects of Catastrophizing on Daytime and Evening Affective Response 
Surfaces 
 Daytime Evening 
Predictor b SE t b SE t 
Daily Level (Level 1)       
PA 0.26** 0.08 3.13 0.34** 0.07 4.93 
NA -0.11 0.09 -1.17 -0.22** 0.07 -3.10 
PA2 0.00 0.00 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.75 
PA x NA 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.81 
NA2 0.00 0.00 0.30 -0.00 0.00 -0.11 
       
Person Level (Level 2)       
PA 0.17 0.16 1.12 -0.01 0.12 -0.08 
NA -0.03 0.17 -0.15 -0.19 0.16 -1.18 
PA2 -0.00 0.00 -1.24 -0.00 0.00 -1.79 
PA x NA -0.00 0.00 -0.64 -0.00 0.00 -1.15 
NA2 0.00 0.00 1.48 0.00 0.00 0.35 
W -0.23** 0.08 -3.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.68 
       
Cross Level Interactions       
W* PA -0.01 0.00 -1.87 -0.00 0.00 -1.57 
W* NA -0.01 0.00 -1.56 0.00 0.00 0.25 
W* PA2 -0.00 0.00 -0.38 -0.00 0.00 -1.55 
W* PA x NA -0.00 0.00 -1.95 -0.00 0.00 -1.63 
W* NA2 -0.00 0.00 -0.87 -0.00 0.00 -0.06 
       
Average RSM Slopes       
Affective Congruence 0.15 0.16 0.93 0.11 0.13 0.92 
Affective Discrepancy 0.37** 0.07 5.27 0.56** 0.06 9.14 
       
Moderating effect of W on RSM Slopes       
Affective Congruence -0.01 0.01 -1.84 -0.00 0.00 -0.69 
Affective Discrepancy -0.00 0.00 -0.18 -0.00 0.00 -1.58 
Note. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01.    
Table 10. Moderating effects of Rumination on Daytime and Evening Affective Response 
Surfaces 
 Daytime Evening 
Predictor b SE t b SE t 
Daily Level (Level 1)       
PA 0.24** 0.08 2.80 0.33** 0.07 4.91 
NA -0.10 0.09 -1.00 -0.20** 0.07 -2.79 
PA2 0.00 0.00 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.67 
PA x NA 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.58 
NA2 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.23 
       
Person Level (Level 2)       
PA 0.13 0.15 0.84 -0.03 0.12 -0.23 
NA -0.12 0.16 -0.71 -0.25 0.16 -1.56 
PA2 -0.00 0.00 -1.51 -0.00 0.00 -1.80 
PA x NA -0.00 0.00 -1.06 -0.00 0.00 -1.26 
NA2 0.00 0.00 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.24 
W 0.02 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.08 1.53 
       
Cross Level Interactions       
W* PA -0.00 0.00 -0.47 -0.00 0.00 -0.90 
W* NA -0.01* 0.01 -2.29 -0.00 0.00 -1.03 
W* PA2 0.00 0.00 0.61 -0.00 0.00 -1.11 
W* PA x NA -0.00 0.00 -0.80 -0.00 0.00 -0.34 
W* NA2 -0.00** 0.00 -2.81 -0.00 0.00 -1.73 
       
Average RSM Slopes       
Affective Congruence 0.14 0.16 0.87 0.13 0.12 1.08 
Affective Discrepancy 0.33** 0.07 4.61 0.53** 0.06 8.89 
       
Moderating effect of W on RSM Slopes       
Affective Congruence -0.02 0.01 -1.64 -0.01 0.01 -1.09 
Affective Discrepancy 0.01** 0.00 2.90 0.00 0.00 0.21 
Note. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01.
Figure 1.  A Sample Affective Response Surface (Top) and Lines of Affective Congruence 
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Figure 7. Evening Affective Response Surface 
 
Figure 8. Moderating effects of Catastrophizing on Daily-averaged Affective Slope of Congruence 
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Figure 9. Moderating effects of Rumination on Daily-averaged Affective Slope of Congruence 
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Figure 10. Moderating effects of Savouring on Daytime Affective Slope of Congruence 
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Figure 11. Moderating effects of Rumination on Daytime Affective Slope of Discrepancy 
